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A B S T R A C T   
Despite pressures to increase performance and decrease costs, innovation has been slow to emerge in the 
municipal wastewater sector. The relationship between regulation and innovation in this sector is a particularly 
interesting aspect of this conundrum, given the degree to which public utility decision-making is influenced by 
regulation. Using a national survey, this paper examines US wastewater utility managers’ perceptions of how 
regulation influences the adoption of new technologies. Recognizing that the relationship between innovation 
and regulation is complex, we develop the concept of regulation as multifaceted and examine three interrelated 
aspects of regulation: (1) regulatory requirements, (2) regulators and relationships, and (3) the broader regu-
latory environment. Specifically, we seek to understand whether and in what ways wastewater utility managers 
perceive these aspects of regulation as hindering or encouraging the adoption of new technologies. We find that, 
although stringent effluent limitations are perceived to be a moderate barrier to innovation, most survey re-
spondents did not identify weakening them as a way to encourage innovation. Instead, respondents generally 
identified factors related to regulatory relationships and factors related to the broader regulatory environment as 
barriers to innovation, and indicated that addressing these aspects of regulation would encourage innovation. We 
conclude that loosening or tightening regulatory requirements is not the most effective way to promote inno-
vation in the municipal wastewater sector. Rather, those parties with an interest in innovation can focus on 
helping utilities and regulators build relationships and better navigate the processes that influence decisions 
about new technologies.   
1. Introduction 
Growing urban populations, aging infrastructure, and increasing 
pressure on government budgets at all levels are straining the capacity of 
urban wastewater treatment systems in the United States (ASCE, 2017; 
GAO, 2019; Hering et al., 2013; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014), and this 
strain is exacerbated by expectations of improvements in water quality 
and environmental stewardship (Daigger, 2009; Reeves and Littlehat, 
2011; Vidal-Dorsch et al., 2012). To address these challenges, the 
municipal wastewater sector will need to innovate in the coming years 
(Carter et al., 2017; Kiparsky et al., 2013; Sedlak, 2014). While inno-
vation in other sectors, including computing, energy, and biotech-
nology, has dramatically accelerated during the last two decades 
(Schwab, 2017), technological change in the wastewater sector has been 
slow (Ajami et al., 2014). This “crisis of innovation” (Thomas and Ford, 
2005) is particularly concerning given that key pieces of US environ-
mental law, including the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA) and its associ-
ated regulations, were intended to encourage the adoption of new 
technologies as a means toward the goal of improved environmental 
quality (Eisner, 2007; Gerard and Lave, 2005). 
In light of this need for the development and adoption of new tech-
nologies in the wastewater sector, it is important to develop a better 
understanding of the barriers that impede innovation. Previous research 
on innovation in urban wastewater utilities suggests that utility man-
agers identify regulatory compliance as one of several significant bar-
riers to innovation, alongside cost/financing and risk aversion among 
utility decision-makers (Kiparsky et al., 2016). However, details of the 
relationship between regulation and innovation in the wastewater sector 
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remain underexplored. 
In the United States, 98% of sewage treatment facilities are publicly 
owned (EPA, 2002), with the operation of these facilities regulated by 
state and federal agencies. While an extensive literature evaluates 
environmental regulation’s impacts on private sector innovation (e.g., 
Ambec et al., 2013; Dechezlepre^tre and Sato, 2017; Driesen, 2003; Jaffe 
and Palmer, 1997), the municipal wastewater sector is distinct in that it 
is not characterized by strong market incentives (Brubaker, 2002; Wolf, 
1979). Instead, a lack of innovation in the sector may be explained by 
price signals muted through the public utility governance structure, as 
well as missing incentives for environmental performance that exceed 
the minimum needed to achieve compliance. Regulation may address 
these shortcoming in the non-market context through carefully struc-
tured policies (Wolf, 1979), or it may exacerbate such failures by fa-
voring incumbent technologies (Stewart, 1981). 
In this paper, we focus on understanding the interactions between 
regulation and innovation in the municipal wastewater sector through a 
survey of wastewater utility managers. We define innovation in terms of 
technology diffusion, while acknowledging that other forms of innova-
tion, such as new management practices, are also important in the 
sector. Recognizing that technology diffusion can be considered an ag-
gregation of individual choices about technology adoption (Sunding and 
Zilberman, 2001), we examine utility managers’ perceptions of how 
regulation affects decisions about the adoption of new technologies. 
To capture the variety of ways in which regulation can influence 
innovation in the wastewater sector, we consider regulation not as a 
singular construct, but rather as a complex and multifaceted one that 
encompasses three major aspects: regulatory requirements, regulators 
and relationships, and the broader regulatory environment. Our analysis 
compares utility managers’ perspectives on regulation and innovation 
within and across these different aspects of regulation. This multifaceted 
framing contributes a deeper and more specific understanding of how 
utility managers perceive regulation as a barrier to innovation, and ways 
that regulation might better encourage it. We find that the regulatory 
barriers and potential solutions identified by wastewater utility man-
agers tend to emphasize the relational aspects of regulation and the 
regulatory environment, and that utility managers place less emphasis 
on specific regulatory requirements. 
2. Regulation and innovation in the municipal wastewater 
sector 
2.1. Wastewater utility regulation under the Clean Water Act 
Since 1972, discharges from U.S. wastewater utilities have been 
regulated under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C. xx
1251–1388). The CWA requires that all point sources discharging pol-
lutants to waters of the United States do so only in compliance with a 
permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES). Municipal wastewater treatment facilities, which the CWA 
refers to as publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), often discharge 
treated effluent to rivers, lakes, or other waters of the United States. 
NPDES permits for these discharges contain a number of elements, 
including effluent limitations, monitoring and reporting requirements, 
and other standard or site-specific terms and conditions intended to 
protect water quality and ensure compliance. NPDES permits usually 
include two types of effluent limitations for POTWs: generally applicable 
“technology-based” limits and additional site-specific “water qual-
ity-based” limits (EPA, 2010). Technology-based effluent limitations for 
POTWs around the nation are grounded in the pollutant reductions 
achievable through secondary treatment processes or equivalent. These 
technology-based effluent limitations have remained unchanged since 
1984, but water quality-based effluent limitations may be more varying 
and more stringent. NPDES permits are issued for up to 5 years and 
utilities must reapply at least 180 days before their existing permit ex-
pires. Permit requirements are likely to change with each renewal based 
on facility changes, regulatory efforts to meet water quality standards 
when receiving waters are impaired, changes to state-designated bene-
ficial uses of receiving waters, changes to effluent limitations related to 
beneficial uses, and other factors. Most interactions between wastewater 
utilities and CWA regulators are likely to occur during the NPDES 
permitting process and, if violations occur, in the context of enforcement 
actions (see Supplemental Information A for more detailed information 
on POTW regulation under the NPDES program). 
To complement the requirements it imposed, the CWA initially 
provided significant federal funding for POTW construction and 
improvement, which contributed to the widespread adoption of sec-
ondary treatment processes in the United States (EPA, 2000). However, 
amendments to the CWA in 1987 greatly reduced the amount of federal 
funding allocated to POTW construction and capital improvement pro-
jects (CBO, 2002). Although limited federal funds are still available, the 
financial burden has largely shifted to states and local governments, 
which have since struggled to meet their capital investment needs (Adler 
et al., 1993; EPA, 2016). In addition, the 1987 CWA amendments 
effectively ended EPA’s Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treat-
ment Technology program (Environmental Law Institute, 1998).1 This 
program provided a higher percentage of federal funding for projects 
employing innovative technologies, guaranteed federal funds for 
modification or replacement in the event of a failed innovative tech-
nology, and included an aggressive technology transfer program to 
disseminate information about funded projects (EPA, 1989). The 
termination of this program may contribute to the slow pace of inno-
vation in the sector. 
2.2. Innovation, regulation, and wastewater treatment technologies 
Broadly, the CWA is considered to be a technology-forcing statute 
(Eisner, 2007) intended to “generate the technology needed to achieve 
acceptable levels of water quality” (Glicksman et al., 2010). Despite the 
technology-forcing intent and the effectiveness of the CWA in spurring 
the adoption of secondary treatment in the United States, the relation-
ship between regulation and the diffusion of new technologies in the 
municipal wastewater sector remains unclear. 
Secondary treatment using activated sludge is a technology that has 
remained largely unchanged in the last 100 years and is still widely used 
in POTWs (Sheik et al., 2014). Literature on the sustainability of 
wastewater technologies has emphasized the relative limitations of 
activated sludge with respect to emissions reductions, resource recov-
ery, and other sustainability criteria (Heidrich et al., 2011; Muga and 
Mihelcic, 2008). In addition, there are increasing concerns about 
disinfection byproducts, endocrine disrupting chemicals, and nutrient 
pollution that are not adequately addressed by the most commonly used 
clean water technologies (Sedlak, 2014). With regard to nutrient 
pollution in particular, there are over 150 thousand miles of rivers and 
nearly 5 million acres of lakes and reservoirs that are considered to be 
impaired in the United States (EPA, 2011). Addressing these and other 
emerging issues will require innovation in the wastewater sector 
(Kiparsky et al., 2013). 
In this paper, we recognize wastewater innovation as the use of new 
and alternative technologies and processes, or the use of existing ap-
proaches in contexts where they are not well established (e.g., Envi-
ronmental Law Institute, 1998). Innovation is thus the combination of 
an invention that results in a new technology, plus the diffusion of that 
technology into markets and practice. In this sector, innovations include 
1 The Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treatment program distin-
guishes between “innovative” and “alternative” technologies, however we do 
not make a distinction in this paper. According to EPA (1989), innovative 
technologies are those that have not been fully-proven for the intended appli-
cation and alternative technologies as those that contribute to cost savings 
through resource recovery. 
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the use of alternative disinfectants, such as ultraviolet light and ozone, 
as well as various biological nutrient removal processes (Hu et al., 2012; 
Mezzanotte et al., 2007). Innovation may also include monitoring, 
software, and information technologies that have the potential to 
improve operations and efficiency of POTWs (Eggimann et al., 2017) or 
refer to the increased use of decentralized systems as an emerging 
paradigm shift for traditionally centralized treatment (Massoud et al., 
2009; Sedlak, 2014; van Loosdrecht and Brdjanovic, 2014). Finally, 
innovative technologies include the use of advanced tertiary treatment 
techniques, such as reverse osmosis and membrane bioreactors that 
often accompany water recycling and reuse (Fane et al., 2011). 
While the CWA may encourage the diffusion of these technologies, 
studies examining innovation in the wastewater sector have pointed to 
regulation as a barrier to the adoption of new technologies (Ajami et al., 
2014; Kiparsky et al., 2016). Data from Kiparsky et al. (2016) suggest 
that wastewater utility managers perceive regulation as a barrier to 
innovation, but that these managers have diverse perceptions of exactly 
how regulation affects their ability to innovate. In their discussion of 
barriers to innovation in the water and wastewater sectors, Ajami et al. 
(2014) describe several barriers related to regulation, including costs 
associated with prolonged regulatory approval, the fragmentation be-
tween different regulatory agencies, and the need for more flexible 
regulatory instruments. However, both of these studies address regula-
tion as one of a broader suite of barriers to innovation, and neither fo-
cuses specifically on the complex ways in which regulation may interact 
with technology diffusion. 
3. The mixed relationship between regulation and innovation 
3.1. Innovation and regulation in the public sector 
While most scholarship on the relationship between innovation and 
regulation has focused on private firms, public utilities have distinct 
characteristics that impact the innovation-regulation dynamic (e.g., 
Brubaker, 2002; Markard and Truffer, 2006). In concept, a new envi-
ronmental control technology may be desirable to a public utility if it 
abates pollution at lower cost, improves environmental outcomes, or 
both. Private firms under competition would be expected to seek out 
these innovations when regulation requires them to internalize envi-
ronmental costs (Driesen, 2003). Public sector utilities, in the absence of 
competition and market incentives, may under- or over-invest in new 
technologies (Wolf, 1979). Public utility managers may, for example, 
identify with a mission-driven or ethical purpose (Dixit, 2002), leading 
them to explore the use of socially or environmentally beneficial tech-
nologies even in the absence of regulation. Utility managers may also 
have incentives to avoid innovation, especially to the extent that new 
technologies carry risk of failure, Managers may be uniquely subject to 
public exposure, and may prefer to avoid bringing additional visibility to 
their operations (Rayner et al., 2005). In general, public sector utilities 
have been characterized as more risk-averse and more inclined to adopt 
conventional technologies than private sector actors (Rayner et al., 
2005; Wagner and Fain, 2018). 
Regulation has the potential to push risk-averse decision-makers to 
consider or adopt new technologies, thereby overcoming their risk- 
averse behavior (Ambec et al., 2013). However, numerous variables 
can influence the degree to which regulation encourages or discourages 
innovation. These include the stringency of regulations, the character-
istics of regulatory tools, the degree of uncertainty about future regu-
latory standards, and even the “style of regulation” (Bernauer et al., 
2007; del Río Gonzalez, 2009; Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Stewart, 
1981). Scholars have also noted that regulation should be sufficiently 
flexible, minimize uncertainty, and be designed to foster continuous 
improvement (Ambec et al., 2013; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). In 
particular, this research has emphasized the importance of stringency 
and the incentives for innovation that relate to the chosen policy in-
strument (Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Kemp et al., 2000; Kemp and 
Pontoglio, 2011). 
Policy instruments can generally be divided into three categories: (1) 
means standards2 or technology specifications (often critiqued as de-
terring innovation through a lack of flexibility); (2) performance stan-
dards (generally thought to better encourage innovation via flexibility); 
and (3) market- or incentive-based programs (conventionally considered 
to be the most effective instrument for encouraging innovation) 
(Coglianese and Nash, 2017; Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Kemp, 1997; 
Stewart, 1981). However, performance standards based on a particular 
technology, such as effluent limitations for POTWs based on secondary 
treatment, may discourage innovation by incentivizing adoption of the 
incumbent technology underlying the performance standard (Andreen, 
2004; Stewart, 1981). Other characteristics of regulation may deter 
innovation as well, including cumbersome administrative processes, 
lengthy permitting times, and lack of regulatory agency resources for 
updating standards (Eisner, 2007; Fiorino, 2006; Ulibarri et al., 2017). 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to examine the rela-
tionship between regulation and innovation, though most have focused 
on a private-sector context (Dechezlepre^tre and Sato, 2017; Jaffe and 
Palmer, 1997; Rubashkina et al., 2015). While these studies have found 
that indeed, regulation has a positive impact on technology diffusion 
(del Río Gonzalez, 2009; Horbach, 2015), they often focus primarily on 
regulatory stringency (for example, by relying on a proxy variable such 
as pollution abatement costs to represent the stringency of regulation) 
(Dechezlepre^tre and Sato, 2017). However, the focus on regulatory 
stringency provides a limited understanding of the multifaceted nature 
of regulation (Brunel and Levinson, 2016). Recognizing this limitation, 
scholars have called for more research examining how various other 
aspects of environmental regulation affect innovation (del Río Gonzalez, 
2009; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011; Rennings, 2000). 
3.2. The many facets of utility regulation 
To facilitate a more detailed understanding of the relationships be-
tween regulation and innovation, we conceptualize regulation as a 
process with three main aspects: regulatory requirements, regulators 
and relationships, and the broader regulatory environment (Table 1). 
First, regulation involves a number of substantive and procedural 
regulatory requirements. These requirements include any environmental 
performance standards, technology requirements, incentive-based reg-
ulatory programs, or other process-based mandates, as well as related 
measures to ensure compliance. In the wastewater sector, this primarily 
consists of the regulation of discharge through a combination of 
technology-based specifications and environmentally-based perfor-
mance standards, as well as related monitoring and reporting 
requirements. 
A second and underemphasized aspect of regulation centers on reg-
ulators and relationships (Willman et al., 2003), the quality and tenor of 
which can play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging inno-
vation. Public sector actors, in particular, may have narrow priorities 
that limit the attention given to innovation, but the process of collabo-
rating with other actors may help broaden their view (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2011). In this way, regulation can be considered more than just 
a set of rules; it also involves communication and discourse between 
regulators and the regulated community (Black, 2002). In the waste-
water sector, these relationships primarily involve utility managers and 
wastewater regulators, but may also include other relevant parties. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that regulation does not originate 
or operate in a vacuum. Instead it is embedded within a broader regu-
latory environment, sometimes referred to as “inter-institutional” and/or 
2 We prefer to use the term “means standard” in lieu of “command and 
control” although the latter is frequently used. As noted by Coglianese and Nash 
(2017) the term “command and control” often expresses an implicit policy in-
strument preference. 
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“intra-institutional” relations (Baldwin et al., 2012), or simply an 
“institutional matrix” (Kemp et al., 2000). The regulatory environment 
may also encompass institutional stability and the costs created by un-
certainty. In the wastewater utility context, we examine the interactions 
between and among various sources of regulation, regulatory mecha-
nisms, and agencies across multiple sectors and scales. We also examine 
the impact of uncertainty about future regulatory requirements. 
Table 1 summarizes these three aspects of regulation through the 
lens of the municipal wastewater sector. Crucially, these aspects are 
interrelated and influence one another, such as when relationships be-
tween utility managers and regulators affect the content of regulatory 
requirements. This framework—which may apply to other regulatory 
contexts as well—contributes a way to consider, and to draw useful 
distinctions between, several important aspects of regulation. It 
informed the structure and content of our survey of wastewater utility 
managers and informs our analysis below (Supplemental Information B). 
4. Methods 
4.1. Survey development and distribution 
To examine perceptions of the relationship between innovation and 
regulation in the municipal wastewater sector, we developed an online 
survey and distributed it nationally to wastewater utility managers.3 The 
survey targeted utility staff responsible for making decisions about 
technology adoption at POTWs, usually with titles General Manager, 
Chief Technical Officer, or similar. The survey began with a gating 
question to ensure that those responding to the survey were appropriate 
decision-makers within their organizations. 
The survey asked respondents about their perceptions of the rela-
tionship between regulation and the adoption of new technologies, 
mostly using Likert-type questions with the option for open-ended 
comments. Respondents were first asked about their experience with a 
variety of innovative treatment technologies and processes so as to 
evaluate their understanding of the various technologies that may be 
available. Respondents were then asked about their perceptions of a 
variety of potential regulatory barriers to the adoption of new technol-
ogy, as well as the extent to which different potential solutions might 
encourage the adoption of new technology. Respondents were addi-
tionally asked to provide basic information about their utility. 
Survey respondents were recruited in several ways. First, we part-
nered with national industry associations including the National Asso-
ciation of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA), the Water Research 
Foundation (WRF), and the Water Environment Federation (WEF); and 
state-level industry associations including the California Association of 
Sanitation Agencies (CASA) and state and regional chapters of the Water 
Environment Association (WEA). Leaders of these professional organi-
zations assisted in piloting the survey and provided feedback on survey 
design, then distributed the surveys to their members via their email 
lists. Second, we distributed the survey via email to POTWs with listed 
email addresses in the public Integrated Compliance Information System 
for NPDES permits (ICIS-NPDES). Third, we mailed postcards with a 
shortened survey link to POTWs holding major NPDES permits, using 
the addresses listed in the ICIS-NPDES database. Email is an optional 
field in the database, but a physical address is a required field. In 
addition, we followed up with a phone call campaign to target utilities 
that did not respond to our email outreach efforts. Table 2 summarizes 
the estimated population and response rate from each of these survey 
distribution methods. Response rates varied widely by distribution 
method, with surveys targeting professional organization members 
receiving a much higher response rate; this variation is congruous with 
reviews of survey response rates (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). We 
encouraged recipients of our emails to forward the survey link to others, 
so it is impossible to know exactly how many people were contacted via 
email, and the response rates presented Table 2 should be considered 
estimates. 
We received responses from 42 states across all 10 EPA regions 
(Fig. 1). While our survey has national coverage, limited data in some 
regions prevents us from resolving regional differences (e.g., Region 2; 
see Supplemental Information C). 
While we acknowledge that our overall response rate is low, we 
received an adequate response rate from utilities that belong to profes-
sional organizations. These utilities tend to be larger and have greater 
organizational capacity. Respondent data confirm that our sample is 
heavily biased toward large facilities, with surveyed utilities indicating 
that they are responsible for sewage treatment services to roughly 35% 
of the sewer-connected US population (see Supplemental Information C 
for a more detailed description of respondent characteristics). Because 
of the low-overall response rate, however, other important biases may 
exist in the sample population. 
Table 1 
Aspects of regulation, with descriptions and examples from the wastewater 
sector.  
Aspect Description Examples 
Regulatory 
requirements 
Requirements established by 
the CWA and associated 
regulations or specified in 
NPDES permits  
 Effluent limitations and other 
performance standards  
 Monitoring and reporting 
requirements  
 Other specific requirements 
in NPDES permits that 
regulate treatment facility 
operations 
Regulators and 
relationships 
Individual and institutional 
characteristics of wastewater 
regulators and their 
relationships with the 
regulated community  
 Approach or “style” of 
individual regulators or 
institutions  
 Regulator capacity (funding, 
knowledge, etc.)  
 Relationships and 
communication between 
regulators and wastewater 
utility managers 
Regulatory 
environment 
The overarching regulatory 
context within which 
wastewater utilities operate, 
encompassing regulation 
under the CWA and other 
federal, state, and local laws  
 Regulation by multiple 
regulators and/or regulatory 
agencies  
 Requirements associated with 
multiple areas of regulation 
(e.g., water quality, air 
quality, activities that affect 
endangered species, solid 
waste disposal, land use)  
 Uncertainty about future 
regulatory requirements  
Table 2 
Response rate from different survey distribution methods. Because duplicates 
have been removed, the total number of utilities contacted is less than the sum of 
the column.   
Number of 
utilities contacted 
Number of 
responses 
Estimated 
response rate 
Professional 
organization 
members 
468 153 33% 
NPDES database email 
list 
2,684 97 4% 
NPDES database 
mailing list 
3,496 25 0.7% 
Total 5,137 275 5%  
3 A second survey with parallel question structure was distributed to regu-
lators of wastewater utilities; the results of this survey and comparison between 
the two surveyed populations will be discussed in a forthcoming paper. 
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4.2. Survey analysis 
Survey respondents were asked to score a list of 25 potential regu-
latory barriers to innovation and 28 potential opportunities to 
encourage innovation using a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5, with 1 
representing “not a barrier” or “no encouragement” and 5 representing a 
“very strong barrier” or “very strong encouragement” (Supplemental 
Information B). We sorted individual Likert-type questions into Likert- 
scale thematic question groups (Boone and Boone, 2012) that reflect 
latent constructs revealed by the full set of survey questions. To arrive at 
these thematic question groups, we used exploratory factor analyses, a 
common survey analysis method that distills many related survey 
questions into underlying explanatory factors (Fricker et al., 2012). The 
factors analyses evaluated how responses to individual questions 
co-vary with one another in order to identify latent constructs. By 
definition, latent constructs are only observable indirectly, so we used 
our professional judgement to assign descriptions to the constructs that 
reflect the common content of the component questions (Table B-1; 
Table B-2). 
Barriers questions were sorted into seven thematic groups and op-
portunity questions into eleven thematic groups. Each thematic question 
group includes between one and four Likert-type questions (Supple-
mental Information B). We further nested each of the question groups 
within the three aspects of regulation described in Table 1 or an “Other: 
Encouraging Pilot Projects” category that we include with potential 
opportunities. For each thematic question group, we averaged the Likert 
responses among the component questions to calculate a “barrier score” 
or “opportunity score” that reflects the relative perceived influence of 
the construct on innovation. 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Regulation and decisions about technology adoption 
Results indicate that regulation is an important factor for utility 
managers considering new technologies, but are ambiguous as to 
whether regulation is a net incentive or a net barrier. 76% of wastewater 
utility managers indicated that concerns about regulatory non- 
compliance are a strong or very strong influence on their willingness 
to consider new technologies (4 or 5 Likert response). Despite the strong 
consensus about regulation’s importance, a large plurality of 
respondents, 45%, indicated that regulation “sometimes discourages 
and sometimes encourages” innovation. Smaller percentages of re-
spondents fell on one side or the other of this question: 19% of 
responding utility managers perceived regulation as “slightly” or 
“strongly” encouraging innovation, while 25% indicated that regulation 
“slightly” or “strongly” discourages innovation. This observation sug-
gests that the situational context matters and validates the more gran-
ular analysis that follows. 
5.2. Regulatory barriers to innovation and opportunities to encourage 
innovation 
Utility mangers indicated that the strongest barriers to innovation 
are found within regulatory relationships and the regulatory environ-
ment. Interestingly, the impact of specific regulatory requirements on 
innovation were seen as more moderate. Out of the seven thematic 
question groups pertaining to potential barriers (Fig. 2), “uncertainty 
about future regulations,” “regulatory approach,” and “regulatory ca-
pacity” received the strongest responses. A pairwise statistical compar-
ison of barrier scores suggests that these top three barriers are perceived 
as similar in priority while “stringency of water quality regulations (too 
strict)” and “complexities and inconsistencies” form a second tier of 
similar priority barriers (Supplemental Information D). 
When asked about potential opportunities to encourage innovation, 
utility managers again emphasized the relational and contextual aspects 
of regulation (Fig. 3). Their responses also suggested strong support for 
opportunities to expand capacity and mitigate risk. Thematic question 
groups related to specific regulatory requirements were again perceived 
as less important than the other two aspects of regulation. Reducing 
stringency of water quality regulations and increasing stringency of 
water quality regulations were perceived as the lowest priority ways to 
encourage innovation. A pairwise statistical comparison between op-
portunity scores suggests that “increasing utility capacity and expanding 
funding opportunities” and “reducing regulatory risk of pilot projects” 
are perceived as having similarly high potential for encouraging the 
adoption of new technologies. A second tier of similar priority oppor-
tunities is composed of “improving collaboration between regulators 
and utilities,” “addressing uncertainty about future regulations,” and 
“addressing complexities and inconsistencies” (Supplemental Informa-
tion D). 
Above, we argued that regulation can be framed in a more nuanced 
Fig. 1. Respondent distribution by EPA region. The circled number shows the response count from the corresponding EPA region. The area of the circle is pro-
portional to the quantity of responses. 
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way. Our findings show that wastewater utility managers view regula-
tion as a strong influence on technology decisions, but do not emphasize 
regulatory stringency. Instead, utility managers highlight other aspects 
of the regulatory process. This provides evidence in support of our 
proposed conceptual model of regulation and demonstrates the need to 
expand assumptions in both the academic literature and practical dis-
cussions about how to understand various aspects of regulation (e.g., 
Brunel and Levinson, 2016). 
5.3. Regulatory requirements 
While regulatory requirements where not emphasized by utility 
managers, understanding how utilities view these requirements can 
provide insights on utility behavior in the non-market context. Survey 
questions about regulatory requirements discussed particular terms and 
parameters associated with the CWA and the NPDES permit system. 
Fig. 2. Perceived regulatory barriers to innovation. The bold vertical line indicates the mean barrier score for the thematic question group, with higher scores 
indicating stronger perceived barriers; the width of the box illustrates one standard deviation. 
Fig. 3. Perceived regulatory opportunities to encourage innovation. The bold vertical line indicates the mean opportunity score, with higher scores indicating 
stronger perceived opportunities; the width of the box illustrates one standard deviation. 
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5.3.1. Stringency of regulatory requirements 
Utility managers in our survey did not indicate that they see reducing 
stringency of water quality regulation as an important factor for 
encouraging the use of new technology. While a considerable number of 
utility managers described overly stringent regulations as a barrier 
(Fig. 4, left side), it was perceived as only a moderate barrier compared 
to others (Fig. 2). Moreover, respondents did not indicate that reducing 
stringency of regulations would encourage innovation. In fact, of all 
proposed opportunities to encourage innovation, “less stringent regu-
lation of water quality” was the single lowest scoring question (Fig. 4, 
right side), scoring lower than “more stringent regulation of water 
quality” as a potential way to encourage innovation (see Fig. 3). 
These moderate views on stringency affirm that utilities should not 
be understood to behave like private firms under regulation. Under a 
neoclassical economic model, private firms are generally understood to 
be intent on limiting costs and, to that end, are expected to push for the 
relaxation of regulatory standards (Gerard and Lave, 2005; Harford, 
1978). Utilities may be motivated by efforts to keep rates low and thus 
be similarly focused on costs. Instead, our finding is consistent with the 
notion that public utilities have a broader set of considerations. In 
particular, this may support the idea that utility managers are intrinsi-
cally motivated agents (Dixit, 2002; Georgellis et al., 2010) that, as one 
respondent put it, view themselves as “allies in protecting the environ-
ment.” In the non-market context, however, this raises questions about 
whether utilities might behave in a risk-averse, or other non-optimal 
manner, that constrains the innovation process (Brown and Osborne, 
2013; Lyon, 1990). 
Open-ended survey data provided additional context for these views. 
Respondents indicated that increased stringency can encourage the 
adoption of new technology by mandating improved performance, but 
this push is tempered by the realities of limited flexibility and resources. 
In these cases, capacity forms a crucial barrier to innovation, pushing 
utilities to select “older, proven technologies” that are more likely to 
receive straightforward regulatory approval. Since effluent limitations 
are based in part on the performance of conventional technologies, 
limited utility capacity may further result in the under-exploration of 
innovative alternatives. 
5.3.2. Regulatory flexibility 
Utility managers emphasized the opportunity to increase the flexi-
bility of regulatory requirements rather than the relax their stringency. 
58% of utility managers indicated that increased flexibility in how 
effluent limitations are expressed in permits would strongly or very 
strongly encourage the employment of new technology (4 or 5 Likert 
response), compared to only 24% who gave the same response with 
regard to reducing regulatory stringency. 
In open-ended questions, survey respondents clarified that strict 
“NPDES compliance schedules” and “rigidity in compliance standards” 
may stand in the way of innovation. For example, utility managers 
referenced how loading limits are expressed (instantaneous, daily, 
weekly, monthly, etc.), with utility managers emphasizing that shorter 
measurement intervals may create a greater risk of being non-compliant. 
Several respondents also emphasized that innovative technical ap-
proaches take time to become effective and that more relaxed ramp up 
periods may be necessary to allow management strategies to adapt to 
new processes. More rigid compliance schedules or shorter measure-
ment intervals may or may not be demonstrably beneficial for aquatic 
ecosystems, however, and allowing additional flexibility when public 
health and ecosystems are not at risk may be an effective method for 
encouraging the use of new technologies. 
These perceptions raise potentially interesting arguments for 
changing approaches to permitting. However, the extent to which 
increasing flexibility in permit terms, parameters, and compliance 
schedules is legal and consistent with CWA is well beyond the scope of 
this paper, as is the evaluation of any tradeoffs inherent in the alter-
ations of permit terms. 
In addition to the above discussion of flexibility in permit terms, 
respondents also see the lack of flexibility of regulators and agencies 
themselves as a barrier. To describe the perceived flexibility or rigidity 
in the regulators approach or “style” (del Río Gonzalez, 2009; Hem-
melskamp et al., 2000), respondents used phrases such as “wonderful to 
work with” or by contrast an “enforcer of rules instead of partners” to 
describe the perceived flexibility or rigidity in the regulatory approach. 
While related to flexibility of specific permit terms, the “lack of flexi-
bility of regulators” elicited a much stronger response from utility 
Fig. 4. Response distributions for questions about the extent to which overly stringent regulation is a barrier and how less stringent regulations would 
encourage innovation. 
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managers: 77% of utility managers indicated that the lack of flexibility 
of regulators is a strong or very strong barrier to the adoption of new 
technology (4 or 5 Likert response). 
While flexibility of regulators was perceived as a strong barrier, op-
portunities associated with the flexibility of specific regulatory tools eli-
cited a more moderate response, especially as compared to other 
proposed opportunities (see Fig. 3). Much of the literature on regulation 
and innovation has emphasized the necessity of sufficiently flexible 
regulatory instruments as a means toward promoting innovation (Ajami 
et al., 2014; Ambec et al., 2013; Environmental Law Institute, 1998; 
Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). Our survey of utility manager perceptions 
supports this literature but adds a key nuance: the lack of flexibility of 
regulators and regulatory agencies is perceived as distinct from, and 
potentially more important, than flexibility as it relates to specific 
NPDES permit requirements. This supports the notion that if regulatory 
change intends to spur innovation, the concept of flexible regulation 
should be extended so as to include both the capacity and behavior of 
individual regulators and the approach of regulatory agencies (Freeman 
and Farber, 2005). This also points to the broader importance and sig-
nificance of relationships between regulators and the regulated 
community. 
5.4. Regulators and relationships 
Utility managers viewed the relationship between the regulator and 
the regulated entity as one of the greatest potential opportunities to 
encourage innovation. Yet, for regulators to engage effectively with 
proponents of innovative technology they require considerable capacity 
to evaluate the underlying science and engineering, and consider any 
tradeoffs. 
Wastewater managers recognize that regulators as individuals are an 
important part of the regulatory process. But, crucially, they also 
recognize the practical limitations regulators face as they evaluate the 
potential applicability and unique needs of new technologies. Re-
spondents identified regulator capacity (including funds, time, and staff) 
and knowledge of unconventional technologies as among the strongest 
barriers. In addition, communication and collaboration were recognized 
as essential: 79% of respondents indicated that “improved communi-
cation between regulators and utilities” would strongly or very strongly 
encourage the adoption of new technology (4 or 5 Likert response). 
Innovation has been described as a process led by an individual 
decision-maker modulated by a complex market and information system 
that includes regulation as a component (Kemp et al., 2000). Broadly, 
we find support for this characterization of innovation, but also the 
perspective that the regulator him or herself may be considered a second 
essential decision-maker and collaborator within the innovation process 
and network (e.g., Black, 2002; Sørensen and Torfing, 2011). This notion 
was supported by the open-ended responses: 
It isn’t about regulation, it’s about developing relationships with the 
person responsible for your permit and working through them to 
achieve end goals. 
In addition, utility managers identified other information networks 
as important and effective ways to promote technology diffusion. Along 
with utility-regulator collaboration, utilities recognized collaboration 
amongst utilities (utility-utility collaboration) and collaboration 
amongst regulators (regulator-regulator collaboration) as similarly high 
priority opportunities to encourage innovation (see Supplemental In-
formation B). Technology transfer efforts that expand information net-
works among and between these groups, such as those emphasized by 
EPA’s former Innovative and Alternative Wastewater Treatment pro-
gram (EPA, 1989), may thus deserve revisiting. 
While recent literature has highlighted that the potential benefits of 
increased collaboration should be tempered by realities including 
limited capacity (Porter and Birdi, 2018), improving communication 
and collaboration within and between communities of regulators and 
utilities was unequivocally identified by utility managers as an impor-
tant strategy to promote the use of new technologies. 
5.5. Regulatory environment 
The regulatory environment was also viewed as more important to 
innovation than regulatory stringency and other specific regulatory re-
quirements. In this section, we focus on complexities and inconsistencies 
across various areas of regulation and examine uncertainty about future 
regulations. We note that non-water quality regulations may be espe-
cially relevant within the context of innovation, as many new technol-
ogies emphasize resource recovery and multi-sector benefits. 
5.5.1. Complexities and inconsistencies 
Although utility managers perceive the context of navigating mul-
tiple agencies’ requirements and regulations to be a barrier to the 
adoption of new technologies (Fig. 2), no one area of regulation was 
perceived as a particularly strong barrier. Fig. 5 shows utility manager 
responses to questions about the extent to which various statutes and 
corresponding regulations encourage or discourage the adoption of new 
technologies—although not all utilities may be subject to each of these 
areas of regulation. 
Water quality regulations and water recycling regulation were 
considered more of an incentive to adopt new technologies than a bar-
rier, while Endangered Species Act regulations, land use regulations, 
and general environmental review slightly discouraged utility consid-
eration of new technologies on average (Supplemental Information B). 
However, almost every one of these questions was met with a neutral 
response by a plurality of utility mangers. 
Because utility managers do not perceive any specific set of regula-
tions to be a strong barrier, we conclude no single area of regulation 
stands out as the primary barrier associated with the multiagency 
context. Rather, utility managers may view the cumulative effect of 
layers of regulation as the principle obstacle. This finding confirms that 
of other studies that have identified the complexity of the multiagency 
context as a challenge to the efficiency of environmental permitting 
processes (e.g., Ulibarri et al., 2017). In order to address these barriers, 
utility managers expressed considerable agreement that better coor-
dination—both between agencies at local, state, and federal scales, and 
between various sectors of regulation—would encourage innovation 
(Supplemental Information B). 
5.5.2. Uncertainty about future regulations 
Uncertainty about future regulations was perceived as a top priority 
barrier to innovation, and increasing regulatory certainty an opportu-
nity to address this barrier. 73% of respondents indicated that uncer-
tainty about future regulations was a strong or very strong barrier (4 or 5 
Likert response), while just 9% of utility managers indicated that this 
was a slight or non-barrier (1 or 2 Likert response). In open-ended 
comments, survey respondents clarified that when utility managers 
discuss uncertainty about future regulations, they are predominately 
thinking about the lifespan of their capital investments and the potential 
return on those investments. Indeed, a large percentage (73%) of re-
spondents indicated that increasing certainty across 5-year permit cycles 
to allow payoff of financial investment would strongly or very strongly 
encourage the adoption of new technologies (4 or 5 Likert response). 
Utility managers emphasized that changing discharge requirements in 5- 
year intervals does not align with the need to make long term capital 
investments, which often require multiple years of planning and con-
struction with multi-decade infrastructure lifespans. As one respondent 
explained: 
We are being encouraged by regulators to voluntarily construct ni-
trogen reducing treatment processes, but we have no guidance on 
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what future limits will be, thereby risking either over-spending or 
having to go back in the future and build additional treatment units. 
The respondent suggests that, while the regulators have provided 
informal encouragement for the adoption of nutrient reduction pro-
cesses, those are not a replacement for the certainty of formal standards. 
Since the adoption of new technologies comes with its own set of risks, 
further uncertainty about whether those technologies will meet future 
regulatory requirements may discourage their adoption. 
In open-ended comments, respondents repeatedly referred to regu-
latory “assurances” as a potential way to address uncertainty about 
future regulations. To the extent that these assurances imply advance 
decisions about permits, they are likely to be legally untenable, although 
an examination of their legality is outside the scope of this paper. 
Additionally, as a practical matter, there are reasons the regulatory 
context is not static. For example, future changes in receiving water 
quality standards needed to protect water uses may necessitate changes 
in effluent limitations or other NPDES permit terms in ways that regu-
lators are not able to predict, or at liberty to speculate on. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that utility managers view uncertainty as a strong barrier to 
innovation and that one potential solution may lie in stronger working 
relationships between utilities and regulators. More frequent and sub-
stantive communications between regulators and utility managers could 
help clarify regulators’ goals and thinking. While this will never result in 
future regulatory certainty, it may be an opportunity to substantially 
mitigate uncertainty. In effect, greater communication could function as 
a qualitative risk sharing measure between the regulated and regulator 
communities (see Section 5.4). 
5.6. Encouraging pilot projects 
Some of our survey questions related to opportunities to encourage 
the use of pilot projects and did not fit well into our three aspects of 
regulation (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, utility managers indicated that the 
single best way to encourage the use of new technology is via additional 
grants, loans, and other sources of funding for pilot projects. Given the 
risk that utility managers face when attempting new technology 
deployment, funding can help create protected spaces for innovation 
(Kemp et al., 1998) and enable greater risk-taking among potential in-
novators in the face of well-established incumbent technologies. 
Along with increased funding, the reduction of regulatory risk was 
also perceived as an important opportunity to encourage pilot projects. 
Risk reduction may encompass a variety of mechanisms, and utility 
managers emphasized in open-ended comments that leniency with 
regards to enforcement would encourage pilot projects. Respondents 
also mentioned the potential for the use of NPDES permit “variances as a 
tool to promote innovation.” In this context, respondents additionally 
highlighted concerns about the potential for citizen suits when trying 
new technologies, which may result in utility liability even in a situation 
where a regulator has elected not to pursue an enforcement action (e.g., 
Lund, 2000; Supplemental Information A). While utility managers ten-
ded to agree that greater risk sharing by regulators would increase the 
utilities’ willingness to run pilots, when and how such risk redistribution 
would be appropriate and compliant with the CWA is outside the scope 
of our analysis. That said, the perception of its benefits with regard to 
running pilots was clearly conveyed. 
Lastly, utility managers responded that technology verification and 
certification programs would offer an opportunity to encourage the 
adoption of new technology. One respondent simply requested that EPA 
offer a list of emerging technologies that it recommends for various 
applications on a periodic basis along with an explanation of why EPA 
believes the technology could be beneficial. The expansion of these types 
of programs may also be helpful to capacity-limited NPDES permit 
writers (as discussed in Section 5.4), with the caveat that one size fits all 
solutions or even plug and play technical approaches will be unusual for 
wastewater treatment. 
6. Conclusions 
Regulation often describes a specific set of rules with which orga-
nizations must comply. Past empirical attempts to test how regulation 
affects innovation have relied on problematic attempts to measure the 
stringency of those rules (Dechezlepre^tre and Sato, 2017; Kemp and 
Pontoglio, 2011). Our study contributes to a broader understanding of 
regulation and suggests that future attempts to assess the relationship 
between regulation and innovation, especially in the public sector, 
should consider regulation as a multidimensional concept which en-
compasses far more than regulatory stringency (Brunel and Levinson, 
2016). 
As we have discussed, regulation can alternatively be defined in a 
relational way, focusing on the processes of communication and the 
relationships between regulators and the regulated community (Black, 
2002). Regulation can also describe the broader regulatory context that 
includes multiple agencies and other institutional factors, termed the 
regulatory environment or “institutional matrix” (Kemp et al., 2000). 
This research details the distinctions between these three aspects of 
regulation, with relevant findings for those seeking to encourage inno-
vation in the wastewater treatment sector in particular, as well as for 
scholarship on innovation and regulation more broadly. 
While a plurality of wastewater utility managers emphasize that 
regulation sometimes functions as a barrier to innovation, the survey 
showed that utility managers do not identify specific regulatory re-
quirements, and the stringency of those requirements, as the primary 
obstacle in considering new technologies. Instead, utility managers 
Fig. 5. Response distributions for the bipolar scale survey question: "To what extent do you think that each of the following areas of regulation encourages or 
discourages the adoption of new technologies?" 
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viewed barriers and opportunities related to relationships with regula-
tors, as well as those related to the broader regulatory context, as more 
important. Utility managers noted that taking steps to address un-
certainties about future regulations and providing guidance through the 
process of navigating complexities and inconsistencies may help to 
encourage the adoption of new technologies. In addition, utility man-
agers suggested that the regulator’s approach, communication, and ca-
pacity were barriers to the adoption of new technologies, and that 
improved communication, collaboration, and increased flexibility are 
important opportunities to encourage innovation. 
We stress that regulatory flexibility can take a variety of forms: in 
particular, utility managers emphasized flexibility of the regulatory 
approach taken by individual regulators and regulatory agencies. This 
may imply that a utility manager’s perception of a regulator as an 
“enforcer of rules” serves as a greater deterrent to innovation than an 
effluent parameter’s specific compliance schedule. At the same time, 
these negative perceptions about the regulatory approach or “style of 
regulation” may be connected to specific legal requirements that cannot 
be circumvented (Gerard and Lave, 2005). 
In practical terms, our research suggests that encouraging innovation 
can best be supported through the expansion of funding and capacity 
support for both utilities and regulators. Increased capacity in both 
communities could support more frequent and substantive interactions 
between utility managers and regulators. Except to the extent that 
funding is codified, our data do not suggest that legislative efforts to 
amend the CWA and its affiliated regulations are an effective way to 
encourage innovation. 
Future research should more closely examine regional differences in 
the perception of barriers and opportunities as well as consider the 
unique challenges that may face small wastewater utilities. In addition, 
future scholarship should more closely examine how regulatory re-
lationships vary between local, state, and federal decision-makers as 
well as within and among regulatory agencies responsible for different 
areas of regulation. We also note that states and municipalities vary in 
their fiscal environment and, while we did not collect detailed infor-
mation about POTW funding sources, this may have a considerable 
impact on investment decisions. Finally, we emphasize that open-ended 
responses alluded to the rich potential for future case study research in 
this sector, which has the potential to illuminate the ways in which 
specific laws and regulations function to promote or stifle the adoption 
of certain new technologies. 
To conclude, we argue that incentivizing innovation is about more 
than just the loosening or tightening of regulatory standards. Based on 
these findings, we emphasize that regulation should be understood as 
more than just the black-letter text contained in statutes and permit 
requirements. To encourage innovation, regulation should be effectively 
supported with resources, knowledge, capacity, and programs geared 
towards supporting innovation and navigating the relational and 
contextual barriers to taking risks. Such efforts will not follow auto-
matically as the result of written regulatory rules, but rather will require 
deliberate, thoughtful action and coordination by a range of decision- 
makers and stakeholders from the regulated and regulator commu-
nities alike. 
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